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This paper studies the properties of the continuous double-auction trading mechanism using an artificial market
populated by heterogeneous computational agents. In particular, we investigate how changes in the population of
traders and in market microstructure characteristics affect price dynamics, information dissemination, and distri-
bution of wealth across agents. In our computer-simulated market only a small fraction of the population observe
the risky asset’s fundamental value with noise, while the rest of the agents try to forecast the asset’s price from past
transaction data. In contrast to other artificial markets, we assume that the risky asset pays no dividend, thus agents
cannot learn from past transaction prices and subsequent dividend payments. We find that private information can
effectively disseminate in the market unless market regulation prevents informed investors from short selling or
borrowing the asset, and these investors do not constitute a critical mass. In such case, not only are markets less
efficient informationally, but may even experience crashes and bubbles. Finally, increased informational efficiency
has a negative impact on informed agents’ trading profits and a positive impact on artificial intelligent agents’
profits.
Key words: artificial financial markets, information dissemination, artificial neural networks, heterogeneous
agents.
1. INTRODUCTION
The continuous double-auction trading system, where any agent can submit orders to
buy or sell to an automatic limit order book, is becoming the standard trading mechanism
in financial markets throughout the world. Many exchanges that formerly worked as pure
price-driven markets are moving to order-driven or double-auction markets. Examples of
this transition are Nasdaq’s SuperMontage, NYSE’s Hybrid MarketSM , or London Stock
Exchange’s electronic order-driven system, which now coexist with traditional quote-driven
trading systems. However, despite the popularity of electronic double-auction financial mar-
kets, the superiority of this trading system over other mechanisms in terms of price efficiency
or higher level of liquidity remain open questions.
The financial literature on market microstructure attempts to explain the process of price
formation and how this process is affected by the market structure and design.1 While the
traditional asset pricing literature is based on the ideal price setting concepts of Walrasian
auction and rational expectations (RE) equilibrium, the market microstructure literature rec-
ognizes that price discovery and information dissemination are complex processes that take
place through a sequence of many bilateral trades potentially affected by frictions and the
conditions of the market mechanism itself.2 Contributions to this literature have mainly been
theoretical (based on simplified economic models) or empirical. More recently, however,
researchers have relied on experiments conducted in laboratories to explore price forma-
tion under realistic trading mechanisms, either with human agents (see, for instance, Plott
and Sunder (1982) and Forsythe, Palfrey, and Plott (1982)) or employing computational
agents.3
1O’Hara (1995) or Madhavan (2000) are two excellent surveys of this literature.
2In a Walrasian auction, individual demand and supply functions are aggregated so the price that clears the market
summarizes investors’ valuations of the asset. In a RE equilibrium, on the other hand, traders rationally update their beliefs
upon observing the Walrasian equilibrium price, thus prices become fully efficient in that they perfectly reflect all information
about the asset.
3See LeBaron (2000) and LeBaron (2001) for a detailed survey of agent-based financial markets.
C© 2007 Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.
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In this paper, we use a computer-simulated market populated by boundedly rational
agents to investigate information dissemination from informed to uninformed traders in
a continuous double-auction market and how market characteristics affect this process. To
achieve this goal, we construct a market where only a small fraction of the population observe
the risky asset’s fundamental value with noise, while the rest of agents try to forecast—in
different ways—the asset’s price from past transaction data.
Our paper is closely related to others, such as Gode and Sunder (1993), who construct
a simple double-auction market where investors submit random orders, and show that the
market price converges to the equilibrium price as long as traders are not allowed to buy or
sell at a loss.4 In a more recent study, Chan et al. (2001) study information dissemination
in a market populated by boundedly rational investors with heterogeneous trading strategies,
which include technical analysis rules and Bayesian learning. They find prices converge
fast to the RE equilibrium price when investors have homogeneous preferences, but the
model fails if this condition does not hold. Our market departs from Chan et al. (2001) in
which the risky asset pays no dividend, so agents cannot learn from past transaction prices
and subsequent dividend payments. Consequently, convergence to the asset’s fundamental
price can only be attributed to private information being disseminated in the market. This
distinction is important because Yang (2002) has shown that uninformed agents with no
private information but endowed with neural learning capabilities can bring market prices to
the RE equilibrium price.
Our artificial market captures well the main stylized facts of real financial markets,
such as nonnormality of returns, skewness, kurtosis, and volatility clustering. Moreover, by
changing different market characteristics we are able to explore how the population of agents
or market microstructure features such as portfolio constraints, explicit transaction costs, or
tick size can affect the dynamics and efficiency of market prices as well as distribution of
wealth across investors.
The paper’s main conclusion is that private information can disseminate effectively in a
continuous double-auction market populated by heterogeneous boundedly rational investors.
We find that, convergence to the fundamental path is possible as long as informed investors’
trades constitute a critical mass capable of correcting price departures from the fundamental
path. Otherwise, the market price may diverge from the asset’s fundamental value, creat-
ing crashes or bubbles. A bubble, in particular, arises in our market when the price moves
above the fundamental path and continues to rise despite informed investors’ initial orders
to sell the asset. If informed investors could short sell the asset, such orders would even-
tually bring prices down; however, in the presence of short-selling constraints informed
investors cannot submit new asks to the limit order book as long as their budget constraint
becomes binding. Only the randomness of market dynamics can then make the asset price
return to the fundamental path and bring it once again under the discipline of informed
traders.
Market characteristics have significant effects on price dynamics, market efficiency, and
distribution of wealth. Interestingly, as the market becomes more efficient due to informed
agents’ trading, the value of their private information decreases, and thus does their ability to
obtain profits at the expense of other investors. The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 presents the features of our artificial market; Section 3 describes the design of
simulations; Section 4 explains the results; and, finally, Section 5 concludes.
4In Gode and Sunder (1993) unaccepted limit orders are deleted with each transaction, unlike in a real market where limit
orders stay in the book until matched by subsequent market orders or canceled by the trader who submitted them.
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2. A CONTINUOUS DOUBLE-AUCTION ARTIFICIAL MARKET
In this section, we describe in detail the features of our artificial market structure: trading
mechanism, the risky asset’s fundamental price, and the characteristics of agents participating
in the market.
2.1. Market Structure
In this artificial market, the agents’ portfolio may contain two assets: a riskless asset
with zero net return (numeraire) and a risky asset. For the risky asset, we model a trading
mechanism with no market maker, where orders are submitted by any investor and matched
automatically. More specifically, our market is similar to the market presented in Chan et al.
(2001).
Each market simulation consists of 1,000 trading periods (one trading period represents
one day), and there are five rounds of trading in each trading period, which implies that each
agent is granted the opportunity to trade a maximum of five times. Participating agents are
sorted randomly5 and the event of each agent participating in a given round is random with
probability 0.7.6 When an agent’s turn arrives, he may submit a limit order, i.e., he may quote
a price to buy (bid) or sell (ask) one unit of the risky asset. Alternatively, the agent may
introduce a market order, which means that he may buy one unit of the risky asset at the best
ask price or sell at the best bid price. As in Chan et al. (2001) or Chiarella and Iori (2002)
we restrict the order size to one unit of the risky asset to limit the dimension of the investor’s
problem.
In addition, the agent must satisfy two different budget constraints at the time of submit-
ting an order. First, he cannot submit market orders, which imply short selling the risky asset
or borrowing. Second, he cannot submit a limit order such that if all his limit orders were
matched at some point in the future, he would have to short sell or borrow. Moreover, every
time agents go to the market they can revoke suboptimal limit orders introduced in the book
in the past. These orders are defined as those that would result in a loss given the agent’s
new beliefs about the risky asset’s price. Finally, agents’ orders to buy (sell) are rounded
downward (upward) to comply with the exchange’s tick size requirements. We have set the
tick size equal to 0.01 dollars for the majority of the experiments but we have changed it
to 10−5 dollars in some experiments to be able to analyze the effects of this variable on the
market dynamics.
2.2. Fundamental Price
In our market, the risky asset pays no dividend at the end of each trading period. Instead,
the risky asset’s fundamental price process is exogenously determined. This assumption
serves four different purposes. First, potential convergence to the asset’s fundamental price
can only be attributed to private information being disseminated in the market, and not
to uninformed traders learning from the observed dividend process as in Yang (2002). In
this way, the degree of informational efficiency becomes a good indicator of the extent of
private information dissemination through prices. Second, the requirement that the asset pays
5A permutation of agents is randomly sampled from all possible permutations according to a uniform discrete distribution.
6It is based on the idea that, in real financial markets, agents do not trade every time: even active agents usually trade a
few times in a trading session. Of course, in real markets, a specific type of agents may account for most trades at some point
in time (for example, informed agents when new information arrives). Modeling such strategic behavior is, however, beyond
the scope of this paper.
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dividends on a regular basis may be unrealistic for some assets such as growth stocks or zero-
coupon bonds. Third, the exogenous fundamental process is directly comparable to the path
of transaction prices. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, this assumption enables us to
model asymmetric information in the most simple way and focus exclusively on differences
in expectations about future prices across agents. In particular, while some investors observe
a noisy signal of the fundamental price, others only observe the history of past transaction
prices and form their expectations accordingly.
We asume that the risky asset’s fundamental price dynamics is governed by a geometric
Brownian motion:
dPf,t = µPf,t dt + σ Pf,t dWt ,
where Pf,t denotes the risky asset’s fundamental price at time t and Wt is a standard Brownian
motion. Under this process, the fundamental price is conditionally lognormally distributed:
ln Pf,t+|Pf,t ∼ φ
(
ln Pf,t +
(
µ − σ
2
2
)
, σ
√

)
, (1)
where  is the time interval between two trading periods (we set  = 250−1) and denotes
the normal density function. The continuously compounded fundamental return between any
two periods, computed as the difference in logs of prices, is normally distributed, serially
independent, and has constant variance. Consequently, possible rejection of normality or serial
independence in real transaction return series can only be caused by the trading process.
2.3. Agents and Trading
All agents are risk neutral and myopic. Their objective function is therefore the expected
value of their wealth at the end of each trading period. The myopic agent assumption is quite
common in computer-simulated markets, because it enables the researcher to abstract from
investment horizon effects. Risk-neutrality, on the other hand, is necessary in our analysis,
because the fundamental price is exogenously determined, and transaction prices would never
converge to the fundamental price if risk-averse investors required a risk premium to buy the
asset. Moreover, under this assumption, investors only have an incentive to trade when their
expectation about the price level diverges from the current market price.
Given their information set and using a previously determined algorithm, the ith agent
forecasts the risky asset’s price at the end of the current trading period, Pit , and buys as long as
the best ask price is at least S dollars below his forecast. Similarly, he sells as long as the best
bid price is at least S dollars above his forecast. This assumption permits us to incorporate
explicit transaction costs such as broker commissions, other fees, or taxes on trading: investors
will trade only if the expected profit from trading is high enough to offset the cost of trading.
Note, however, that a higher value of S will decrease the volume/frequency of trading. In our
simulations, the exact value of S for each agent at each round is a realization from a uniform
distribution.7
The agent can also submit a new bid (Pit − S) or ask (Pit + S). The agent’s limit order
is subsequently added to the limit order book in the corresponding position. Table 1 displays
the agents’ decision process.
Agents differ from each other in the way they obtain their forecast of the risky asset’s
price. In our market we consider four different classes of agents:
7It tries to reflect the fact that in real financial markets there is a huge heterogeneity in the transaction cost among different
agents (i.e., between private investors and institutional investors).
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TABLE 1. Order Generation Procedure.
Scenario Order
Case 1: There is at least one ask price and one bid price in the limit order book∗
Pit > a + S Market order to buy
Pit ≤ b − S Market order to sell
a + S > Pit > b − S & Limit order to sell
|a − Pit | > |Pit − b| with ask = Pit + S
a + S > Pit > b − S & Limit order to buy
|a − Pit | ≤ |Pit − b| with bid = Pit − S
Case 2: There are no bid prices
Pit > a + S Market order to buy
Pit ≤ a + S Limit order to buy
with bid = Pit − S
Case 3: There are no ask prices
Pit < b − S Market order to sell
Pit ≥ b − S Limit order to sell
with ask = Pit + S
Case 4: There are no ask or bid prices
With probability 12 Limit order to buy
with bid = Pit − S
With probability 12 Limit order to sell
with ask = Pit + S
∗The lowest ask prevailing in the limit order book when the agent takes his decision is
denoted by a and the highest bid is denoted by b.
(i) Zero Intelligence (ZI) agents. In our market, ZI agents increase trading volume since
they introduce discrepancy in the risky asset’s valuation.8 Their prediction for the risky
asset’s price is a realization of a random variable, which is uniformly distributed around
the last transaction price:
Pit ∼ U (0.9Pτ , 1.1Pτ ),
where τ denotes the last time the risky asset was traded. This way of modeling ZI
agents’ behavior departs from that of Gode and Sunder (1993), because in our market
ZI agents modify their prediction with every transaction. Consequently, if the market
were exclusively populated by ZI agents, we would not expect convergence to the
“equilibrium price,” because a high (low) transaction price would shift expectations
for all agents upward (downward). Moreover, the presence of ZI agents enables us to
assess the effect of informed-based trading on uninformed traders’ wealth.
8ZI agents are similar in spirit to the “noise traders” of the financial literature. Noise traders explain the large volume of
trade we observe in real financial markets, which is not consistent with a market populated exclusively by rational investors
(Kyle 1985). The existence of a significant fraction of retail investors who trade excessively and underperform the market index
in real financial markets has been documented by Barber and Odean (2000).
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(ii) Informed agents. They observe the risky asset’s fundamental price plus some noise.
Their forecast of the asset’s price is therefore:
Pit ∼ U (0.99Pf,t , 1.01Pf,t ).
We could think of informed agents as fundamentalist traders (more noise) or as insider
traders (less noise). It should be noted that only to the extent that informed traders’
orders can drive market prices toward the risky asset’s fundamental value, prices have
the potential to become informationally efficient.
(iii) ANN agents. These investors use a nonlinear model (artificial neural networks [ANN])
to forecast next period’s return. ANN have been usually considered as complex models
inspired in the structure of the brain. ANNs inherit three basic characteristics of the
biological neurons: they are intrinsically parallel; they provide nonlinear responses to
stimulus; and they process the information through several layers of interconnected
neurons. One of the main characteristics of ANNs is their capacity to “learn” and
“generalize” using real data, that is, an ANN learns the relationship between a set of
inputs and their corresponding outputs, and for this reason they have been widely used
in several financial problems, especially in forecasting issues on different financial
assets (see Hansen, McDonald, and Nelson [1999] and the special issue on financial
engineering of the IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks [IEEE 2001], among oth-
ers). An ANN is formed by a number of processing units, which are hierarchically
organized in layers. The input layer consists of a set of nodes that receive the infor-
mation from the outside world. The hidden layer processes the information while the
output layer sends the signal to the outside.9 The most widely used structure is that
of a feed-forward neural net in which the information is hierarchically processed in a
single way from the input layer to the output through the hidden layer(s). The units are
connected through a synaptic weight, which determines quantitatively the influence of
one unit on the other. The ANN agents in our market use a feed-forward neural net with
a unique hidden layer10 with “g” units, “h” units in the input layer (past transaction
returns), and a unique unit in the output layer (next period’s return). It is important to
highlight that the net is not fixed during a simulation, but retrained each “m” trading
periods. More specifically, we select the parameters, g = 8, h = 10, m = 50, and the
number of epochs used for training the nets is 200. These parameters were selected
after some experimentation and are a compromise between the net’s performance and
computer time.
It must be remarked that both the inputs and the output considered in the struc-
ture of the ANN are returns. Therefore, the ANN agents recursively approximate the
relationship between past transaction returns and next return as the nonlinear model
specification that minimizes mean squared forecast errors in the history of observed
transaction prices. ANN agents then use information on the last 10 returns to fore-
cast next return (see Figure 1 for a description of the ANN architecture). Finally, this
forecast of next return (Rit ) is employed to predict the asset’s price as:
Pit = Pτ
(
1 + Rit
)
,
9Kuan and White (1994) provide an introduction to ANNs in an econometric context, showing that these models are, in
fact, quite familiar to the econometrician, see it for a more detailed description.
10Hornik, Stinchcombe, and White (1989) showed that an ANN with a single hidden layer with enough hidden logistic
units and linear outputs can approximate arbitrarily well any measurable function.
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FIGURE 1. Architecture of the neural net. Rt−h represents the asset’s returns computed as the relative differ-
ence between the transaction h periods ago and the transaction price in the previous period.
where τ denotes the last time the risky asset was traded and Pit the ith agent forecast
of the risky asset’s price at the end of the current trading period.
We employ the log-sigmoid transfer function in the hidden layer and the linear
transfer function in the output layer, as in most common feed-forward ANNs. The
training algorithm used is the batch Levenberg–Marquardt backpropagation algorithm
(see Hagan and Menhaj 1994), which like the quasi-Newton methods was designated to
approach second-order training speed without having to compute the Hessian matrix.
We use this training algorithm because it is one of the fastest methods for feed-forward
neural networks and it is also very efficiently implemented in the software used for this
study, MATLAB.
(iv) Technical Analysts (TA). These agents attempt to identify trends in price series. In
particular, they compute the average close price of last “s” trading periods and the
average close price of last “l” periods, where “s” is either 1, 2, or 5 periods with equal
probability and “l” can take the following values: 50, 150, or 200, also with equal
probability.11 If the short moving average is higher than the long moving average the
TA will think the market is bullish and will want to buy the risky asset. Otherwise,
11These parameters for the long and short mean moving averages have been taken from Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron
(1992).
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he will sell.12 TA’s actions therefore differ slightly from those of the rest of agents.
In particular, in a bullish market, a TA will buy at the prevailing ask price, a, if there
is at least one ask price with Pit > a + S, where Pit is taken to be price of the last
transaction. Otherwise, they will submit a limit order to buy with bid equals to Pit − S.
Analogously, in a bearish market, TAs will sell at the prevailing bid price, b, if there
is at least one bid price with Pit < b − S and will submit a limit order to sell with ask
equal to Pit + S, otherwise.
At the beginning of each simulation, each agent receives an identical endowment
consisting of 3,000 dollars and 30 units of the risky asset. Because TAs and ANN
agents require a minimum number of transactions before they start to trade, wealth is
reinitialized again when all agents operate simultaneously. For this reason, in the first
200 periods only informed agents and ZI agents participate and we do not take into
account these results in our further analysis.
3. SIMULATION DESIGN
To analyze the sensitivity of market’s efficiency to market parameters we have simulated
10 paths of fundamental values according to equation (1) with a different µ for each path
(uniformly distributed between +/−5%), and P f,0 = 100. The reason why we let µ change
is to ensure that results do not depend on a specific market trend. Next, for each fundamen-
tal path, we have simulated a total of 1,000 trading periods, changing one of the market
parameters at a time.13 More specifically, we have considered the parameter sets shown in
Table 2.
To study convergence of the price dynamics to the fundamental path, we compute the
following measures proposed by Theissen (2000).
(a) Mean Absolute Error
It is the average of absolute deviations of the transaction close price from the
fundamental price:
MAE = 1
T
T∑
t=1
∣∣Pt − Pf,t ∣∣
(b) Mean Relative Error
It enables comparisons across different paths:
MRE = 1
T
T∑
t=1
∣∣Pt − Pf,t ∣∣
Pf,t
(c) Root Mean Squared Error
This measure weights extreme relative errors more heavily:
RMSE =
√√√√ 1
T
T∑
t=1
(
Pt − Pf,t
Pf,t
)2
12In future extensions, TA agents might use some kind of evolutionary algorithm (as a genetic algorithm) to select among
competing forecast rules as in Arthur et al. (1997) or Lettau (1997).
13Because each trading period contains five trading rounds, each simulation consists of 5,000 trading rounds.
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TABLE 2. Sensitivity Analysis
Number of Agents Budget
Explicit
Market Informed ANN TA Cash Asset Unit Transaction Costs (S) Ticks
Benchmark 40 10 40 3,000 30 U (0,2) 0.01
Market 1 20 10 40 3,000 30 U (0,2) 0.01
Market 2 40 0 40 3,000 30 U (0,2) 0.01
Market 3 40 10 0 3,000 30 U (0,2) 0.01
Market 4 40 10 40 ∞ ∞ U (0,2) 0.01
Market 5 40 10 40 3,000 30 U (0,2.5) 0.01
Market 6 40 10 40 3,000 30 U (0,3.5) 0.01
Market 7 40 10 40 3,000 30 U (0,2) 10−5
∗The number of ZI agents is 120 in all markets and the standard deviation of the fundamental prices is fixed to
10% for all experiments.
4. RESULTS
In this section, we perform a sensitivity analysis based on controlled experiments where
the value of one parameter of the market is changed at a time. In particular, we study the
effects of changes in the population of agents and market microstructure on price dynamics,
informational efficiency, and distribution of wealth across traders.
4.1. The Benchmark Market
Table 3 displays descriptive statistics of end-of-period returns averaged across all sim-
ulations for each market. In our benchmark market, the table shows that trading itself (or
TABLE 3. Descriptive Statistics for Returns
Return Std. Dev. Reject. Jarque–Bera
(%) (%) Skw Kur VaR Norm Statistic Volume
Fundamental −0.83 9.97 0.016 2.9 2.02 0 – –
Benchmark −2.09 25.13 −0.009 7.1 8.46 6 3,032.1 288.8
Market 1 1.09 65.87 −0.15 17.0 31.70 10 9,733.0 254.6
Market 2 −0.67 34.66 −0.44 21.6 17.37 9 47,868.0 284.8
Market 3 −0.27 27.85 0.03 4.0 6.43 4 154.9 281.9
Market 4 −0.49 18.09 −0.22 8.7 7.04 8 2,540.8 309.6
Market 5 −0.29 21.92 0.29 7.8 4.58 1 7,577.3 242.3
Market 6 −0.42 19.81 −0.039 3.1 4.35 1 36.6 228.2
Market 7 −0.44 26.5 −0.07 9 9.21 6 2,958.9 290.2
Return is the mean annualized return in percentage averaged across all simulations in a given market. Std. dev.
denotes the average mean annualized standard deviation in percentage. Skw indicates the mean skewness, Kur
is kurtosis, VaR denotes the maximum price decrease with a 99% probability, Reject. norm shows the number
of times (out of 10 simulations) that the null hypothesis of normality is rejected using the Jarque–Bera test at
1% significance level. The value of the Jarque–Bera statistic is shown in the next column, and the last column
(Volume) denotes the average number of transactions in a market per trading period. We also include descriptive
statistics for fundamental prices.
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TABLE 4. The Analysis of ARCH Effects
Rejected at 1% Rejected at 5%
Significance Level Significance Level
Fundamental 2 0
Benchmark 4 3
Market 1 10 10
Market 2 8 7
Market 3 3 3
Market 4 5 5
Market 5 1 1
Market 6 2 2
Market 7 6 6
This table shows the number of simulations the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity
is rejected for each market using Engle (1982) test.
microstructure noise) accounts for more than half the standard deviation of market returns:
25.13%, as opposed to 10% in the fundamental series. Moreover, value at risk (VaR), i.e., the
maximum relative decline in the risky asset’s price between two consecutive periods is four
times higher for actual market returns than for the fundamental path.
Table 3 also shows that market returns in the benchmark market are characterized by
excess kurtosis and negative skewness.14 Moreover, the null hypothesis of normal returns
is rejected in 6 of the 10 simulated series at the 1% significance level, according to the
Jarque–Bera normality test.
Another typical characteristic of financial series is volatility clustering: periods of high
volatility tend to be followed by periods of high volatility and viceversa. Autoregressive con-
ditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) captures such effects. In order to test for the presence of
ARCH effects, we implement Engle (1982) test for the null hypothesis of no serial correlation
in conditional volatility. Table 4 displays the number of simulated series in each market for
which the null hypothesis is rejected. For the benchmark case, as many as four of all the series
display ARCH effects in the disturbance term of the return process.15 Volatility clustering
has also been documented in other artificial markets (Lux 1995, and LeBaron et al. 1999,
among others). To summarize, our benchmark market therefore captures stylized facts of real
financial market price dynamics.
Next, we analyze informational efficiency in the benchmark market. As Table 5 shows,
mean relative error equals about 3% on average, a small figure relative to the standard
deviation of market returns. To show the divergence between actual market returns and
the fundamental path, we have chosen a single simulation and displayed fundamental and
market prices and returns on Figure 2. The figure also includes the series of transactions
per period. We conclude that private information disseminates efficiently in the benchmark
market, which gives uninformed agents endowed with artificial intelligence the opportunity
to learn from transaction prices. This becomes evident in Table 6, where we display the
average investor’s return by agent class between the first and last period. While the average
informed agent exploits his informational advantage to the extent of obtaining a total portfolio
14These results have also been found in some other artificial markets (LeBaron, Arthur, and Palmer 1999, among others).
15We have previously fitted an autoregressive process to conditional mean returns.
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TABLE 5. Analysis of Informational Efficiency
MAE MRE RMSE
Benchmark 3.63 3.17% 5.96%
Market 1 17.54 17.24% 28.02%
Market 2 2.00 2.04% 4.68%
Market 3 1.03 1.04% 1.32%
Market 4 0.81 0.82% 1.13%
Market 5 3.54 3.09% 5.84%
Market 6 2.48 2.1% 3.52%
Market 7 3.3 3.06% 6.68%
This table shows the average values of three different measures of market
efficiency. MAE denotes the mean absolute error (defined as the difference
between the transaction price and the fundamental price), MRE is the mean
relative error (the absolute error divided by the fundamental price), and RMSE
is the root of the mean squared relative error.
return of 31%, the average ANN agent, who enjoys no private information, makes a profit of
14.1%. Even TA can exploit market trends to make a small positive return of 1.56%. Such
profits are made at the expense of ZI agents, who lose 17.19% of their initial wealth on
average.
4.2. Effect of Changes in Agent Population
When the number of informed agents is halved (Market 1), price dynamics depart more
noticeably from the fundamental distribution as can be seen from Table 3: volatility increases
from 25.13% in the benchmark market to 65.87%, negative skewness, kurtosis, and VaR
also rise significantly. Normality is rejected in all simulations. This is accompanied by less
liquidity as measured by the average number of transactions period (last column of Table 3).
Also, Table 4 suggests that ARCH effects are always present in series of returns generated
in this market. Finally, as shown in Table 5 price efficiency drops dramatically in Market 1
with respect to the benchmark market, with mean relative errors close to 20%.
To understand these results, we consider a single fundamental path and analyze price
dynamics in the benchmark market and Market 1. Figure 3 shows the evolution of fundamental
and transaction prices and returns for a single path in Market 1. This Figure is in contrast to
Figure 2 that corresponds to the same single path under the benchmark market. First, the high
volatility of returns is apparent from the bottom panel (returns) of Figure 3 in all periods. This
suggests that informed investors not only ensure convergence to price fundamentals, but also
reduce excess volatility in transaction prices. This result suggests that turbulence in actual
financial markets may actually be the consequence of less precise aggregate information in
the market about fundamentals.
Figure 3 also reveals the presence of an interesting phenomenon. While transaction prices
in Market 1 tend to track the fundamental path in most periods, from period 200 to period
350, the market experiences a crash. This crash starts with a sharp decline in the asset’s price
followed by a relative stability, and finally, a quick return to the fundamental path that is
not abandoned again. Interestingly, the medium panel shows that trade volume peaks when
prices fall and rise, and remains relatively low in between.
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FIGURE 2. Price dynamics in the benchmark market. The dotted line corresponds to transaction prices/returns
and the solid line corresponds to fundamental prices/returns.
TABLE 6. Analysis of Informational Efficiency
ZI Informed Technical ANN
Agents Agents Agents Agents
Benchmark −17.19% 31.01% 1.56% 14.10%
Market 1 −8.60% 84.73% −23.42% 5.48%
Market 2 −16.13% 47.51% −3.21% –
Market 3 −16.91% 43.72% – 20.84%
Market 4 – – – –
Market 5 −22.65% 19.12% −9.80% 3.66%
Market 6 −9.35% 21.14% 0.95% 11.01%
Market 7 −15.28% 40.21% −0.24% 13.31%
This table shows the average agent’s return achieved by each class of agents at the
end of each market. A positive (negative) return implies that on average this kind of
agents has gained (lost) wealth in the trading process in that market.
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FIGURE 3. Price dynamics in market 1. The dotted line corresponds to transaction prices/returns and the
solid line corresponds to fundamental prices/returns.
To understand the crash in market 1, we look at the evolution of agents’ average positions
per investor class, which are displayed in Figure 4. The figure clearly shows that as technical
analysts sell their positions, possibly following a minor downward trend, the price falls below
its fundamental value, which further reinforces their belief that the market has started to
decline. Informed investors then increase their positions in the asset. By doing so, however,
they run out of cash, and because borrowing is not permitted, they cannot submit new bids
to the system, thus the decline in transaction price continues. At some point, because TA
are also constrained by short selling restrictions, they cannot continue selling and prices
end up stabilizing. Toward period 300, only ANN agents and ZI agents can trade. As prices
eventually rise above their recent mean, TA start to buy from ANN and ZI agents, and
prices start to rise again. Around period 350, prices have already reached the fundamental
path and keep rising, thus informed traders intervene again by selling the asset. This time,
however, their orders manage to bring prices down to the fundamental path. Informed agents
must therefore create a critical mass for information to disseminate in the market. The crash
therefore teaches us that informed agents must constitute a critical mass to disseminate their
private information throughout the market and correct price movements. The size of their
critical mass is a function of both their number and their aggregate wealth. When they are not
enough in number and have constrained budgets, herding TA can drive market prices away
from fundamentals.
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FIGURE 4. Agents’ average positions per investor category in market 1. This table shows the agent’s position
in cash, risk asset, and also the total wealth in each trading period. The thick solid, thin solid, dashed, and dotted
lines correspond to informed investors, zero intelligence agents, technical analysts, and ANN agents, respectively.
Also, it is interesting to note that informed agents in this inefficient market enjoy a greater
informational advantage that, as Table 6 shows, enables them to make an average portfolio
return of 84.73%, mostly at the expense of TA. Clearly, less information dissemination
also means that private information is more valuable. In informationally efficient markets
with fully revealing prices, private information would have no value, thus it would not be
profitable to collect it, as postulated by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) in a RE equilibrium
framework. Another consequence of price inefficiency is that ANN agents learn less about
the fundamental process, and therefore, make lower profits.
In markets 2 and 3, we investigate the effect of a reduction in the number of ANN agents
and TA, respectively. Table 3 suggests that reducing the number of ANN agents has an effect
on market dynamics similar to that of reducing the number of informed agents: Volatility,
VaR, negative skewness, and kurtosis increase with respect to the benchmark. Also, ARCH
effects are present in 8 of the 10 simulated series as can been seen in Table 4. Eliminating
TA from the market, however, affects market dynamics only slightly although VaR, kurtosis,
volatility clustering, and nonnormality reduce marginally, and skewness becomes positive.
These results imply that TA contribute to nonnormality in returns while ANN agents induce
the opposite effect. The presence of both, however, reduces the relative weight of informed
agents, and therefore, their ability to influence prices as evidenced by Table 5: when ANN
agents or TA are eliminated, mean relative errors reduce to only 2% and 1%, respectively.
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FIGURE 5. Price dynamics in market 2. The dotted line corresponds to transaction prices/returns and the
solid line corresponds to fundamental prices/returns.
Large sustained deviations of transaction prices from the fundamental process, however, are
still possible. Figure 5 shows market dynamics for a selected simulation under Market 2
where ANN agents do not operate. The top panel indicates that around the 800th period,
prices start to increase very fast above the risky asset’s fundamental value to reach a peak
and decrease to the fundamental path before the 840th period. Volume increases both at the
beginning and the end of the bubble and stays lower than average in the meantime. Figure 6
sheds light on the reason behind such anomalous behavior: the bubble starts when TA detect
an upward trend in prices and start to buy the asset. Informed agents then react by selling
the asset until they have no units of the asset left. A few periods later, TA run out of cash
and the bubble starts to burst. The situation is therefore very similar but inverse to that of
Figures 2 and 3. Again, the combination of a limited budget for informed traders, together
with short-selling constraints and the presence of TA can trigger a major mispricing episode.
As for wealth distribution, Table 6 indicates that while ZI agents’ returns are not sensitive
to the presence of ANN agents and TA, informed agents make a higher return (47.5% as
opposed to 31%), especially when there are no ANN agents, possibly due to decreased
competition for ZI agents’ money.
4.3. Effect of Portfolio Constraints
Because price efficiency appears to be limited by the presence of restrictions on short-
selling and borrowing together with a binding budget constraint for informed traders, it is
PRICE DYNAMICS, INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY, AND WEALTH DISTRIBUTION 191
200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1,000
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
CASH
200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1,000
0
20
40
60
80
ASSET UNITS
200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1,000
0
5,000
10,000
TOTAL WEALTH
FIGURE 6. Agents’ average positions per investor category in market 2. This table shows the agent’s position
in cash, risk asset and also the total wealth in each trading period. The thick solid, thin solid, and dashed lines
correspond to informed investors, zero intelligence agents, and technical analysts, respectively.
an interesting exercise to investigate how the market behaves when such constraint is never
binding, as is the case in Market 4. As we can see in Table 3, Market 4 is characterized
by lower volatility and marginally lower VaR than the benchmark market, although returns
display slightly more kurtosis and negative skewness. Absence of ARCH effects is also
rejected more frequently than in the benchmark case as Table 4 suggests.
Significant differences become evident, however, when we analyze market efficiency.
Table 5 shows that mean relative errors in this market are below 1% on average. Clearly,
when informed investors are not constrained by their budget, their ability to influence prices
is much stronger and the probability of bubbles and crashes becomes very low. The idea
that short sale or borrowing constraints can prevent information or opinions from being
reflected in stock prices is not new. Miller (1977) or Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) models
express this point formally. Our paper shows that the same perverse effect of short selling
and borrowing constraints is present in more complex markets populated by heterogenous
boundedly rational investors.
4.4. Effect of Transaction Costs
Several papers (Keim and Madhavan 1997; Barclay et al. 1999; or Domowitz, Glen,
and Madhavan 2001, among others) in the financial literature postulate that trading cost
represents a relevant variable in the trading process. Keim and Madhavan (1997) claims
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that transaction cost are central in determining investment performance and can substantially
reduce the expected value created by an investment strategy. Lesmond et al. (1999) points out
that transaction cost estimates are not always available, or where available, are cumbersome
to use and expensive to purchase. They propose a new way to estimate them and find that
total transaction cost (explicit plus implicit) ranges from 10.3% for small firms to 1.2% for
the large firms.
In a more recent paper, Domowitz et al. (2001) analyze the interactions between cost, liq-
uidity, and volatility, and their determinants, using panel-data for 42 countries from September
1996 to December 1998. They offer empirical evidence of the huge variability of trading cost
across countries (emerging and developed ones) and that the composition of global efficient
portfolios could change severely when cost and turnover are taken into account.
The trading costs are usually decomposed into two components: explicit costs and implicit
costs. Explicit costs are the direct costs of trading, such as broker commission costs, or even
taxes, etc. Implicit costs represent indirect trading cost (the more important is the price impact
of the trade). According to Domowitz et al. (2001) in general, explicit costs are the major
element in the total trading costs (they represent roughly two-thirds of total cost). Therefore,
in this section, we generate two new markets (markets 5 and 6) to analyze the effects of the
explicit transaction cost, on the previous results.
We achieve this goal by increasing the upper bound of S to 2.5 and 3.5 in markets 5 and
6, respectively. According to Table 3, in market 5 the volatility in returns and, most notably,
VaR decreases with respect to the benchmark market. Moreover, normality in this market is
only rejected in 30% of the simulations. This outcome is confirmed by the results found for
the market 6 (Table 3). In this case we can observe that the volatility decreases to 19.8%, the
VaR is reduced to half of the VaR found in the Benchmark market, and the kurtosis value is
very close to the kurtosis in a normal distribution.
Although not shown in the paper for the sake of brevity, our analysis of the limit order
book suggests that higher explicit transaction costs make trading less likely and increases
the depth of the limit order book. The natural consequence is a reduction in the sensitivity of
market prices to minor shifts in investors’ expectations, and hence in volatility and volume.
We can observe this fact in the last column of Table 3 (volume decreases in 16% and 26% in
markets 5 and 6, respectively).
In Table 4 we also analyze the probability of achieving volatility clustering in these
two markets. We observe the hypothesis of homoscedasticity is rejected only in 20% of the
simulations.
Perhaps more interesting are the results reported in Table 5, where we can observe that
there is a positive relationship between the level of transaction cost and market efficiency.
Specifically, in the case of the market 6, the value of the RMSE is almost half of the RMSE
in the benchmark case. Our interpretation of market 6 results is the following. Consider
the specific case of the agent with the highest expected price. In our market, this investor
belongs almost certainly to the ZI agent set. If he trades with any other investor, he will be
the buyer and never the seller, because no one values the asset more than himself. Note that
higher explicit transaction costs lower the price at which any investor is willing to buy, thus
the buyer compensates for the lower expected profit. This implies that the highest price at
which the asset will be bought (by the investor with the highest price forecast) will decrease
when we assume higher explicit transaction costs. A similar reasoning implies that the lowest
price at which the asset will be sold (by the investor with the lowest price forecast) will
increase in the presence of higher transaction costs. More generally, as trading becomes
more costly, the group of investors with the highest price forecasts will tend to buy at lower
prices and the group of investors with the lowest price forecasts will tend to sell at higher
prices. Consequently, transaction prices in the tails of the distribution become closer to prices
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in the center of the distribution and market efficiency rises. This interesting result suggests
that explicit transaction costs are a potentially powerful tool for market designers to increase
market efficiency.
4.5. Effect of Tick Size
Finally, we study how a specific feature of the market microstructure, the tick size,
affects price dynamics, and agents’ portfolio profits. Harris (1994) shows that tick size plays
an important role in determining the quality of double-auction trading system. Tick size
determines the minimum spread that can be quoted and as a consequence the distribution of
volume in different price levels. The previous evidence related with trading activity shows
some interesting results. First, Harris (1994) is the only paper finding a positive relationship
between volume or trading activity and reduction of tick size. The rest of the papers find no
significant evidence.16
The relationship between tick size and volatility is more conclusive. Ronen and Weaver
(2001) and Bessembinder (2000) find that tick level is associated with intra- and interday
volatility for different markets.
In Tables 3 and 5 we can see that if the tick size (minimum price increment allowed)
is reduced to $10−5 (market 7) from $0.01 (benchmark market) the effects on the basic
characteristics of the returns distribution and the efficiency are slightly different. Thus, the
volatility and VaR increase slightly, and so does the volume. Moreover, we find that the
change in tick size does not affect significantly the market’s efficiency. However, in Table 4
we observe that the probability of finding volatility clustering increases in market 7 compared
to the benchmark. Finally, Table 6 shows that informed agents are able to improve their
performance in a market with lower tick size, because they can introduce more accurate
prices in the system to increase their profits. The wealth achieved by the rest of the agents is
not changed significantly.
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Experiments with humans and with computational agents have demonstrated that private
information can disseminate well in continuous double-auction markets. The exact mech-
anism through which such transfer of information is possible or the limits to information
dissemination deserve a deeper look. This paper attempts to shed light on these issues, which
have important implications for both academics and market structure designers. In particular,
we investigate further the way information disseminates from informed to uninformed traders
in a market populated by heterogeneous boundedly rational agents. To achieve our goal, we
construct a computer simulated market where only a small fraction of the population observe
the risky asset’s fundamental value with noise, while the rest of agents try to forecast the
asset’s price from past transaction data.
We find that the more relevant stylized facts in financial markets can be obtained in an
artificial financial market even when investors are risk-neutral, myopic, and do not behave
strategically. Another interesting finding is that if informed traders constitute a critical mass
of population, their private information can be properly disseminated through the market.
16See Lau and McInish (1995), Ahn, Cao, and Choe (1998), Ronen and Weaver (2001), and Bourghelle and Declerck
(2004). The argument to justify these result is that relationship between activity and tick size cannot be isolated from other
variables.
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However, when they do not represent a critical mass, then irrational dynamics such as bubble
or crashes can emerge. This impossibility to drive transaction prices to the risky asset’s funda-
mental value seems to decrease when borrowing and short-selling restrictions are eliminated.
In this case, informed agents’ ability to influence prices is much stronger and the probability
of bubbles and crashes becomes almost zero. However, as the market becomes more efficient
the value of private information decreases, and so does the profit of informed agents. In-
terestingly, agents endowed with artificial intelligence obtain higher trading profits in more
efficient markets given that transaction prices contain more precise information about the
true fundamental process that agents are able to learn.
Changes in the fraction of technical analysts and artificial neural network agents alter
market dynamics but not the main conclusions regarding the ability of private information to
disseminate in a double-auction market. In addition, we also analyze the effect of changing
some specific features of the market microstructure: the explicit transaction cost and tick
size. We find that there is a positive relationship between the level of explicit transaction cost
and market efficiency. This striking result suggests that explicit transaction costs could be
a potentially powerful tool for market designers to attempt to increase market efficiency in
some cases.
Finally, tick size in this market does not seem to affect significantly price dynamics or
market efficiency. However, we find that the informed (or insiders) agents are able to improve
their performance in a market with lower tick size, because they can introduce more accurate
prices in the system and profit more from their informational advantage.
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